To date the application of safety systems in the Process Industry in particular has largely been through dedicated hardwired systems where the use of networks or shared bus communications has not been acceptable for the connections to the field equipment. In other industry sectors dedicated and specialist bus systems are increasingly being adopted in safety systems. Suppliers of safety systems are also incorporating bus technologies in their offerings to the market.
As the use of bus communications and intelligent systems, coupled with the use of open systems technologies becomes widely accepted, the reliance on dedicated hardwired connections for safety applications will become increasingly difficult to sustain.
Of the seven papers presented at the conference in May three have been selected for publication in this special edition of "Measurement & Control", to outline some of the issues to be addressed and approaches being adopted in the practical use of data buses in safety related applications:
• "An examination of the practical challenges presented by the use of digital communications in safety related applications" by Andrew White of the Health and Safety Executive. This paper provides a view of the "current state of play" and the potential for the future use of data buses and digital communications in safety applications as seen from a regulators perspective.
• "Black channel communications networks: what they do and how they work" by Gerry Creech of ICS Triplex. This paper outlines the differences between "white" and "black" channels in communications networks, their benefits, limitations and constraints and how they can be applied in safety systems.
• "Safety related data transmission for railway signalling and control"
by Roger Short of Atkins Rail. This paper outlines how the railway sector is addressing the topic of communication networks and data buses in safety applications.
We hope that you find these papers interesting and useful to your own line of work or general professional interest. What are the aspects of functional safety that particularly concern you or areas where you think more guidance could be made available? Feedback from readers on this special edition will be welcome, as would suggestions for future conference topics or subject areas that could be addressed by the Safety Panel.
The Safety Panel aims to arrange at least one conference or seminar each year and to also support Local Sections if they decide to run an event on a safety related topic. The next conference being planned is "SIL Capability -Not just pfd" to take place in Warrington on 2 nd April 2008 (postponed from September 2007). Advance booking for this can be made via conferences@instmc.org.uk. We also aim to regularly support a special edition of Measurement and Control by publishing papers or related material from the events that we organise or attend. 
Introduction
This paper examines the practical challenges presented by the use of digital communications in safety-related applications.
Sometimes a safety-related system is referred to as a safety instrumented system, protection system, or safety-critical system. This paper uses the term 'safety-related' to encompass all these, following the definition given in the standard BS EN (IEC) 61508 -part 4 4 . A control system is not normally regarded as playing a major role in achieving safety.
Digital communications are being increasingly used in safety-related systems to transmit information. Many suppliers of components that are intended to support safety functions have incorporated digital communication capabilities in their products, with some having multiple communication ports and the ability to communicate using a wide variety of protocols. It may even be difficult to purchase certain safety-related devices that don't have communications systems incorporated into them.
There are a wide range of digital communication systems and protocols in common use, some of which have been designed specifically for safety applications. However, many communication systems have been developed to meet the needs of Information Technology (IT) systems, and are being applied to engineering systems due to their ease of use, low cost, and ability to connect a wide variety of devices.
This paper does not attempt to describe the capabilities of individual communication devices or their suitability for specific applications; the British Standards Institution publication 'Selecting the best fieldbus for your application' 1 may help with this.
The regulatory perspective
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 2 places specific legal duties on those who control work activities. Section 2 of the Act states "It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare of all his employees…" including "…the provision and maintenance of plant and systems of work that are, so far as is reasonably practicable, safe and without risks to health". Section 3 of the same Act places a duty on an employer (including the self employed) to "ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health and safety". Section 6 of the same Act places a duty on designers, manufacturers, installers, importers or suppliers of articles for use at work to ensure that they are safe and without risk to health.
Those involved in the design or integration of a safety-related system should take reasonably practicable measures to ensure the safety-related system does not expose people to undue risks to their health and safety.
The Consumer Protection Act 1987 3 gives people injured by defective products the right to sue the producer of the product for damages without having to prove that the manufacturer was negligent. A defective product is one where the safety of the product is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect.
Employers, designers, and contractors need to be sure they possess the competencies necessary to design a safety-related system that meets all legal requirements.
Risks should be controlled by applying a hierarchy of measures. For example, it is better to eliminate hazards, or reduce their potential consequences, if possible, as this often cost-effective, reduces design work, saves time, and leads to a safer system.
Anatomy of a safety-related system
A safety-related system performs one or more safety functions which can each be implemented using an electrical, electronic or mechanical system, other means, or by a mixture of these. Failure of a safety function significantly increases the likelihood of injury or harm to the health of people. Where it carries safety-related information, a digital communication system contributes to the operation of at least one safety function.
The action of all safety functions together should meet legal requirements, and individual safety functions need to be dependable enough to do the job required of them.
Simple non-programmable safety-related systems generally have well defined and understood failure modes. The presence of a failure is often relatively easy to recognise by plant operators and to diagnose and repair by a maintainer with relevant competence. Programmable safety-related systems may, in certain circumstances, replace non-programmable ones and can provide additional features that may be beneficial. Programmable safety-related systems with digital communications can provide even greater functionality, reduce wiring, and simplify maintenance, although a great deal of attention needs to be paid to their design and use so that these benefits are realised and not outweighed by the practical difficulties of deploying and maintaining sufficient integrity.
The BS EN (IEC) 61508 4 family of functional safety standards provides general guidance on how to design a safety-related system in most industries. BS EN (IEC) 61511 5 describes how the principles of BS EN (IEC) 61508 can be applied specifically to process plant, and BS EN 62061 6 provides guidance for the machinery sector. These standards describe a safety lifecycle that, if adhered to, can provide confidence that all elements of the design process are adequately covered and that the safety-related system will work as the designer intended when it is called upon to do so. BS EN 50159 (IEC 62280) 7 provides guidance on the use of closed and open communications in safety-related railway systems.
Functional safety standards require that each safety function be allocated a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) according to the level of risk reduction that has been attributed to it during the safety requirements allocation stage of the safety lifecycle. There are a number of ways to select an appropriate SIL for a safety function using numerical calculation and qualitative estimation. A list of techniques is presented in BS EN (IEC) 61508.
The failure modes of all parts of a safety-related system should be assessed for their impact on the level of risk control provided by the complete system. Digital communication systems require correct interaction between many items of hardware and software.
It should be noted that any safety-related system should be tested rigorously before it enters service, and at appropriate intervals in service. Theoretical performance alone does not guarantee that a safety-related system is adequate for its purpose.
When the failure of a safety function will always lead to the realisation of a hazard, called a continuous mode safety function, special measures will have to be taken to prevent failure of that safety-related system. Where digital communications contribute to the operation of a continuous mode safety function, special measures will include means to guarantee data transmission, even in the presence of faults. Continuous mode safety functions are avoided if possible, and are not covered by this paper.
Process Safety Time
To be effective, safety-related systems must be able to take action quickly enough to prevent intolerable risks to individuals or society. The process safety time is the time period between a failure occurring in the process or the basic process control system (with the potential to give rise to a hazardous event) and the occurrence of the hazardous event if the safety function is not performed 8 . The process safety time includes sensing delays, sensor data transmission time, decision-making, actuator command transmission time, actuator operation time, and delays in the effect of the actuator on the process. It is very important to note that delays in the transmission of safety-related information, such as those caused by communication errors and recovery, may significantly increase the response time of a safety function. The safety function must be able to act in significantly less than the process safety time even under fault conditions, or another safety measure should be available to take on this role.
Safety actions and watchdogs
Most safety actions involve the removal of power to a field device such as a valve or electrical contactor, so allowing a simple mechanism such as a spring to open or close the valve, or open the contactor.
Many complex safety-related devices that implement safety functions utilise a relatively simple hardware mechanism called a watchdog to trigger a safety action in the event of detected failures. The watchdog and failure detection mechanism must have a suitable integrity for safety function(s) being implemented by the device. However, some devices that incorporate digital communications allow the watchdog to be configured so that it is suitable for the application. This configuration may include the time before a safety action is taken, what event should lead to the triggering of the safety action, how many communication errors are allowed before a safety action is taken, or disabling of the safety action altogether. Clearly there is the potential for incorrect configuration to lead to a failure of the device to trigger a safety action within the time allocated for it. Section 11 on configuration describes some of the challenges posed by the correct configuration of safety actions.
The influence of information on a safety-related system
In safety-related systems it is normal to limit the number of external influences on the behaviour of the system, and great lengths are generally taken to ensure this, so that the safety integrity of the safety functions can be assured. The influences in such systems are limited to information from inputs (automated and/or human) and stored states, which bring about a programmed output response.
Where information is being delivered to a safety-related system by means of a digital communications connection, it is possible for a very significant amount of data to be available to the system, and to potentially influence its response. Information may influence input states, stored states, system configuration, or change the sequence of programmed instructions, some of these in a dynamic way.
Errors or faults in information being delivered to a safety-related system has the potential to immediately influence the behaviour of a safety-related system and, where it leads to changes in internal states, could influence the behaviour of a safety-related system at any time in the future.
In addition, the presence of additional information has the potential to greatly increase the complexity of a safety-related system, making meaningful testing to identify faults very time consuming, or practically impossible.
Any safety-related system that uses information should have a means to ensure that the information has suitable integrity. Where the information is delivered by a digital communication system there should be a means of detecting errors or failures, according to the safety integrity of safety functions using the information, and taking action to ensure risks are adequately controlled. Equally, devices that produce information, such as sensors, or programmable devices, must themselves ensure its integrity. A single device of low integrity that propagates faulty or incorrect information has the potential to seriously affect the integrity of the parts of the safety-related system that use the information, or data derived from it.
Where information is used by a safety-related system, it is possible for the following problems to influence behaviour: 1. Information is not available when it is needed (too early or too late) 2. Information is available, but incorrect, or incompatible with other information
These situations may have a number of potential causes that arise from the operational challenges the system is exposed to. Many of these operational challenges stem from practical limitations in how a safety-related system is designed, commissioned, operated, maintained and modified. Some of these are described in the remainder of this paper.
Competence
Safety-related systems that use digital communication device should be designed to an appropriate standard, such as BS EN (IEC) 61508, by personnel competent to do so. The additional challenges presented by the use of digital communications should be considered such that commissioning, operational and maintenance staff are able to attain the competence necessary to ensure the safety functions implemented by the safety-related system retain sufficient safety integrity. Independent assessment of the measures implemented to control risk may be necessary.
Where digital communication systems are used to transmit safetyrelated information, these should be maintained by staff who are competent to do such work, and who can identify potential threats to the correct operation of the system. Staff should be competent to identify actions that need to be taken on indication of a failure or problem.
Proof testing and overrides
Devices performing a safety action must be proof tested regularly enough that there is little chance they will fail when a demand is placed on them, so that risk is adequately controlled. This may be difficult to accomplish as a complete test may trigger a safety action that is inconvenient or which increases the risks. It is thus common for temporary overrides to be activated to allow more complete proof testing. Where overrides are activated via data received from a digital communications connection, it is essential that there is little chance that a fault or error can lead to one or more overrides being inadvertently activated. Thus the override data should have sufficient integrity, and it is often appropriate to apply other measures such as an extreme limitation on the number of simultaneously active overrides, provide indication to operators when overrides are active, and a physical master override switch.
Communication devices may be automatically proof tested by the regular transmission of test messages, but this may not exercise all parts of the communication network, or the devices connected to the network, and some faults may not be identified or correctly reported.
Sometimes communication systems are designed with a redundant or backup path that should be tested to ensure that it could transmit the quantity and type of data that may be required in the event of a failure of the primary system. It is also essential that the secondary communication path is triggered to act when it is required, and that data is not lost, replicated, or buffered during the switch from one path to another.
Diagnostic coverage
If faults that could affect the integrity of safety-related information cannot be identified by the detection mechanism, there is the potential for a dangerous failure to go unrecognised, and for the safety-related system to fail to respond to a subsequent demand. BS EN (IEC) 61508 part 2, annex C describes means by which diagnostic coverage can be identified. However, users of communication systems may not know what can go wrong with the communication system, and how it can be detected, and so may be unable to identify the diagnostic coverage. Manufacturers of communication systems that are suitable for use in safety-related systems should be able to provide information on how the communication system must be used, in order to achieve the desired safety integrity.
It is generally possible for a safety-related digital communication system to be used in a way that contravenes the manufacturer's instructions, and which significantly reduces the integrity of the safety functions relying upon it, or even disables safety features altogether.
Even if faults in a safety-related system have been detected, these may not be reported correctly or in a timely manner due to communication problems. This could lead to the safety-related system failing to act, or for process operators to be unable to identify why a plant shutdown has occurred. Such events often erode confidence in the safety-related system and could lead to the system being disabled or permanently overridden.
Device complexity and certification
Whilst digital communication systems can confer many benefits on an electronic control system, such as reduced wiring complexity, more flexibility in where items of equipment can be placed, the ability to have subsystems with their own autonomous control, and provide more information about the status of the process and the devices controlling and monitoring that process, they also result in increased complexity.
The increase in complexity results from the amount of hardware and software required by a communications system to operate, and to detect faults. This complexity is of a different nature to the complexity of traditional wiring systems, and different skills are required to design, commission, operate, maintain and modify such systems. Organisations without knowledge of the challenges posed by communication systems either have to rely on technical partners, or develop the knowledge in-house. The former can result in an organisation being locked-in to a particular equipment supplier, whilst the latter can take time to achieve and effort to maintain.
It is unlikely that the complex hardware and software in a digital communications device is completely free of design faults that could lead to a failure or unexpected behaviour. However, devices that have been designed and tested to a suitable design standard (such as BS EN (IEC) 61508 for functional safety) are more likely to have had potential failure modes identified, analysed, and eliminated, or measures put in place to reduce their impact.
It is common for safety-related devices to be advertised as a SIL x device, and to be supplied with a certificate indicating the design has passed an integrity assessment. However, there is often not enough detail provided with such a device to indicate what functions achieve a particular SIL capability and how these have been assessed, and how the device should be implemented, operated and maintained in order for the SIL capability to be continuously realised.
Complex interaction between communicating devices
Where two or more items of plant are operated in a way that is coordinated by timely and correct information exchange, there is the potential for the state of the items to get out of step. This problem may be particularly acute where operators are performing direct control and are expecting a timely and predictable response, such as the control of a crane. A communication failure, even if it is only temporary, may result in a change in response time that may prevent the operator achieving the required degree of control. Significant unexpected variation in response times may be an indication of an inadequately designed system, or the presence of a fault, although not all faults may have this effect.
Particular problems may occur where a safety-related system has been subjected to an upset such as a power supply failure, emergency stop, or an abnormal start-up or shutdown. These types of events have the potential to cause large numbers of messages to be transmitted onto the communication network. Some of these messages may be repeating, or may be stimulated by the response of other parts of the system, and could be temporarily stored in buffers. It could be some significant time before the safety-related system reaches a steady state again. In some cases, specific actions may be required to re-synchronise the safety-related system into a state that is ready to perform as designed.
Complex interaction between different parts of a safety-related system may make it difficult for process operators to understand what is happening when a process deviation occurs. Potentially large amounts of information can be presented to the process operator, but this may make no sense if the operator does not have a clear understanding of how the system is supposed to work and how changes in one part of a system can affect others.
Maintenance can be significantly more complex where a number of devices have to be placed in the correct state prior to maintenance being carried out, and then re-commissioned prior to being returned to service. Where personnel do not understand how the system is intended to operate, or how to determine when success has been achieved, errors may lead to the failure of a safety-related function at any time in the future.
Separation between safety information and non safety information
Parts of a system that do not contribute to a safety function are generally considered not to be safety-related. However, in reality, a range of events external to a safety-related system can have an impact on it. For example, the modification of a control system may result in a dramatic increase in the demand rate on the safety-related system, or a type of demand for which the safety-related system is not designed.
Separation may be physical, where different digital communication components are used for safety-related and non safety-related functions, or functional where digital communication components perform both, but where there are additional measures to protect the safety-related part from the effects of the non safety-related parts.
Where there is limited separation between safety-related parts and non safety-related parts of a system, then every part of that system should be treated as safety-related, unless analysis proves the opposite. Any modification without suitable safety analyses during installation, commissioning and maintenance could result in incorrect operation of safety functions.
Strongly separating the safety-related and non safety-related parts of a system allows greater effort to be focused on the safetyrelated parts and also means that there is less likelihood that a single common cause event will cause a failure of the control and safety systems at the same time. Similarly, if redundant safety-related systems are used, it is important that common cause events do not affect both primary and secondary systems at the same time or in the same way.
In process industries it is common for a safety-related system to be one of a number of different layers of protection, each of which limits the potential for, and impact of, a hazardous event. The strengthening or weakening of a layer of protection adjacent to the safety-related system layer requires the capability of the safety-related system to be re-assessed for its suitability.
It should be noted that the addition of a single digital communication connection, or a change in configuration, could lead to reduced separation between safety-related and non safety-related systems.
Creeping connectivity
A significant problem with safety-related digital communication systems is 'creeping connectivity' . This is where safety-related information is mixed with non safety-related information by a communication network connection, or within a device that is connected to both the safety-related and non safety-related communication networks, generally with the best of intentions such as providing additional process information to operators or managers. This step may be well planned, and the potential for interaction between the safety-related system and non safety-related system may be recognised, minimised, and controlled. However, it is common for business information networks to be regularly modified to meet the needs of the business. Because these networks are not safety-related, little or no effort may be employed to assess if the changes are likely to lead to a safety implication. Thus it may be that the business information network may be connected to a wide range of plant, may be used to carry a wide variety of data, and may even be connected to external networks. This provides the potential for external events to interfere with the safety-related information.
An organisation may expend significant resources on maintaining good internal control of its communication systems, but may have difficulty controlling the activities of individual employees or contractors, even if strict working practices are agreed. This may result in inadvertent connection to the internet with little or no firewall protection.
The danger of creeping connectivity is one of the reasons why it is important that safety-related digital communication systems are adequately isolated from business information networks.
Using additional information in a safety-related system
A feature of using digital communication systems is that additional devices can usually be quickly and easily added to provide more information about the process. Sometimes a large amount of additional information can be made available just by making a single communication link.
However, it is good practice for safety-related systems to be as simple as possible and it is essential that the information being used by a safety function has adequate safety integrity. Use of information provided by a low integrity sensor, or derived from a number of low integrity sensors, for a safety function, requires that the sensor(s) should be regarded as safety-related. Information from a sensor that has a quoted safety integrity, but which is passed through a low integrity digital communication device may not have adequate integrity for a safety function. This places all sorts of demands on the way that the sensor(s) and digital communication devices should be specified, commissioned, operated, maintained and modified, and also how higher integrity information should be transmitted from place to place.
It may be identified that there are specific safety benefits to be gained from providing additional information about the process. If these benefits outweigh the potential disadvantages of the additional connectivity on safety grounds, then a strong argument may be supportable. However, it is important to remember that the safety-related system must be protected from challenges to its correct operation throughout the life of the system. When more devices are used to perform safety functions, it will become more difficult to ensure that inadvertent or unauthorised changes are not made to these, particularly where devices are complex.
When changes are made to safety-related devices, the potential effect on the safety-related system should be identified by someone
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Remote diagnosis of equipment
It is common for modern equipment to have the facility to be remotely interrogated so that failures or process problems can be identified. The manufacturer of the equipment may stipulate this to ensure service and efficiency contractual agreements are met, and this generally requires the equipment to be connected to a public or business digital communications network.
Unless there is strong protection within the equipment, there is the potential for remote interrogation to result in inadvertent, unauthorised or malicious changes to be made. Changes in state initiated within the equipment by remote means could have an impact on equipment safety, and even the action of interrogating equipment may be disruptive enough to prevent normal operation.
For these reasons it is strongly recommended that equipment only be connected to the remote interrogation network when this is essential, and it is important for the functionality of equipment to be fully tested after the interrogation has been completed.
It is important that software being used to perform an interrogation has adequate integrity and that adequate measures are put into place to prevent inadvertent changes to the equipment being interrogated.
Modification of safety-related software
As a minimum, a safety impact assessment should always be conducted before safety-related software is modified. According to the integrity of the safety functions performed by the software, significant additional work may also be required.
Where safety-related software is modified by downloading using a digital communication link, it is essential that measures are in place to identify errors or faults that could lead to software being incorrect. Potential problems may include single bit errors, missing sections of code, or incorrect placing of code segments. A single checksum may not have sufficient integrity to ensure safety functions continue to be operable; other measures may need to be implemented.
Configuration changes
Many devices that can connect to a digital communications system are highly configurable. This configurability gives the system designer flexibility to use the device in a number of different ways. Some devices may allow selection of measurement units, alarm settings, action on fault, scaling values, offset values, and many others. Where such a device is used to perform a safety function, an incorrect configuration could lead to a failure of the safety-related system to detect a demand, or for the wrong action to be taken, either by the device itself, or by a process operator who is using feedback from the device to decide which action to take. Even if more than one identical device is used for redundancy, the use of a faulty common configuration for several devices could lead to a failure to take the desired safety action.
According to the integrity requirements for information or actions provided by configurable devices, it will generally be necessary for additional actions to be performed to confirm that the configuration is correct, such as reading back the programmed values, or checking the device is behaving as anticipated.
Where the configuration of a device is critical to the correct functioning of a safety device, measures need to be put in place to prevent inadvertent or unauthorised changes to the configuration. According to the extent of the digital communication network attached to the device, configuration may be done remotely significant distances from the physical location of the device. As a consequence, traditional physical access controls such as locked cabinets and authorised areas may not be effective. Equally, as a wide variety of programming devices including desktop computers, laptop computers and even handheld computers may be used to make the configuration changes, there should be defences of sufficient integrity to prevent unwanted re-configuration. Methods such as the use of passwords, physical keys, or software keys need to have a suitable level of integrity that matches that required by the safety function(s) being supported by the configurable device.
Automated configuration systems
Some integrated systems provide the facility for the control system to identify when configuration changes have been made, possibly as a result of inadvertent re-configuration or as a result of a component being replaced due to a failure, and for the correct configuration to be downloaded. Where an automated system such as this is used, care must be taken to ensure that the automated configuration system has a suitable integrity, and that legitimate configuration changes are not overwritten by the automated system. Equally, data stored in a device that may be necessary for correct start-up may have been lost, necessitating a commissioning procedure to be undertaken.
Fault finding, maintenance and replacement
Many field devices require regular maintenance, particularly in safety-related applications. Fault finding or maintenance activities may require the device to be placed in a test mode, or for the configuration to be temporarily changed. Sometimes this is done locally, and sometimes by remote means. It is important that personnel who perform fault finding and/or maintenance understand the potentially complex tests that may need to be carried out, and that they are able to restore the device to its normal settings and working configuration. Mistakes can be made where a device has a number of very similar operational modes, or where an old device is replaced by a new one and the configuration has to be copied across by hand, or via an electronic system. Sometimes devices need replacing. However, the new device may have different software or hardware which means that it will perform differently from the original. The previous configuration may not work in the same way, and simple tests may not reveal the differences. For this reason it is important for the version numbers of devices to be recorded, and adequate testing of replacements to be carried out.
Difficulties can arise where there have been changes to specifications and the old devices are no longer available, necessitating a change to a different version or device. In such cases the replacement needs to be treated as a modification, and a safety impact analysis carried out.
Where manufacturers of general purpose communication devices are not used to the demands of safety-related systems they may make changes to a device that could impair its performance, with no external indications being available to the user. The substitution of one component for another may have a significant impact on an attribute of the device that directly affects safety, or indirectly affects safety through operational problems such as loss of availability.
Modification
The configuration of many communication devices can be changed very easily once any security system that prevents this has been overcome. There may be a strong motivation in certain circumstances for process operators to 'tweak' the settings of a communication device to reduce operational problems. Where there are complex interactions between devices, this may result in unintended effects that may include unexpected tripping or failure of a safety function.
Modification to devices that are performing safety functions should only be carried out after a wide ranging analysis of the impact of the change by personnel with the skills to make such an analysis.
Power Loss
Problems can arise where there is a failure of power, and where there is information about the state of a process stored in devices connected to a communication network. This could result in the transmission of old data, or data that is not synchronised with other data. As a consequence the safety-related system may fail to take safety action when required to do so, or to take action when there is no need. Process operators may rapidly lose confidence in a safetyrelated system that causes unwarranted shut downs and may ignore information or prevent the system from taking safety actions.
Display and use of information
It is common for information transmitted by digital communication systems to be used by process operators to make decisions regarding the best action to take in the event of a failure that could lead to a hazardous event. Such systems permit the potential flexibility of human intervention to provide a more appropriate response to a wider range of challenges than that which may be easily achieved by automated systems.
However, the information that is presented to operators may arrive from many different locations, via a variety of different digital communication paths, and pass through a number of different devices before it is displayed. There is the risk that some information may take considerably longer to make the journey from the measurement point than other information, particularly under fault conditions where digital communication networks may be more heavily loaded than usual. Where plant conditions are changing rapidly (again, likely under fault conditions), the operator may be presented with information that is out of step in time, and which may appear contradictory.
An extreme case of information delay is where there is a complete loss of communication with some parts of the plant that may lead to some data values 'freezing' whilst others continue to reflect measurements made on the plant. Under these conditions it is unlikely a plant operator will be able to identify the cause of problems and may have to take drastic action that may increase the risks posed by the plant to other personnel, and which could have significant financial consequences. Equally, under these conditions, plant operators may not be able to decide the best course of action, and may take no action to avert an incipient event.
A significant challenge with safety-related systems that incorporate digital communications is the amount of information that can be displayed, and the temptation to present plant operators with a lot of information simply because it is available. Presenting plant operators with too much information is likely to cause confusion, result in poor decision making, and prevent timely decisions from being made. Too much information may also divert operators from other important sources of information, such as the sight, smell and sounds of the plant. Thus a significant amount of effort needs to be put in only presenting the requisite information at the time it is needed.
Where information is displayed in the form of alarms, it is essential that the information is accurate and delivered in a timely manner at a rate that can be dealt with by process operators. The meaning of alarms should be clear, along with actions to resolve problems causing the alarms. Where digital communications are used to convey information relating to alarm systems, measures should be in place to ensure the information is available when needed, and has sufficient integrity. Guidance on alarms is given in reference 10 and 11.
Proven-in-use and Prior use
Where there is a need to incorporate a safety-related device in a design, that device should ideally have been designed according to a suitable functional safety standard (such are IEC 61508). It may be the case that no such device is available. It is also possible that devices with no strong design documentation may have been effectively used for many years.
IEC 61508 (part 2, 7.4.7.5) describes a process whereby the use of a safety-related device may be justified on the basis of it having been 'Proven-in-use' . BS EN (IEC) 61511 uses the term 'Prior use' to mean a similar thing.
A justification to use a component in a safety-related system because it is Proven-in-use, or has Prior use can be very difficult to make as the device should have (IEC 61508) "…clearly restricted functionality and …adequate documentary evidence which is based on the previous use of a specific configuration…(during which time all failures have been formally recorded…)". to say that the documentary evidence shall be sufficient to demonstrate that the likelihood of a failure is low enough and that the previous conditions of use are close enough to the intended use that the required safety integrity can be achieved.
BS EN (IEC) 61511 (11.5.3.2) requires the evidence to include: -consideration of the manufacturer's quality, management and configuration management systems; -adequate identification and specification of the components or subsystems; -demonstration of the performance of the components or subsystems in similar operating profiles and physical environments; -the volume of the operating experience.
BS EN (IEC) 61511 goes on to say that users may maintain lists of suitable components. However, the list should be regularly updated, and action taken in the event of a discovery that a particular component has a previously unsuspected failure mode, or other aspect that could compromise its performance.
The wide variety and complexity of digital communication devices, network configurations, type of communication traffic, and variation of that traffic may make it very difficult to show that a particular communication device is indeed 'proven in use' for a specific application. To do this the manufacturer of the device has to know in what conditions each one is operating, and exactly what failures have occurred and for what reason. Many communication network devices are cheap enough for end users to simply throw failed devices away, rather than return them to the manufacturer for analysis and repair. Also, failures that can be fixed by a simple reset, cycling the power, or reloading the configuration, are unlikely to be recorded at all. These factors are likely to lead to significant under reporting of failures.
Where the device is intended for use in higher safety integrity applications it may be difficult to achieve enough running time in an appropriate environment for a proven in use argument to be legitimately made.
Security
Where access can be gained to communication networks, and the devices connected to them, damage may be caused inadvertently, or deliberately. Thus security is a significant issue where parts of a safety-related system are connected by a communication system.
Traditional methods of security such as preventing unauthorised staff from physically accessing safety-related plant are unlikely to be effective, as damage could be caused by simply connecting into a safety-related communication system, and the safety-related system may be spread over a large physical area.
Where the extent of a communication system is regularly changed, and different devices are connected to it, there is the potential for new challenges to arise that only become evident when there is a problem. For this reason communication systems carrying safetyrelated information should, if possible, remain fixed in size, and with the same devices connected to them.
Safety-related devices connected to public networks may not be able to withstand the types of challenges present on these. The changing nature of electronic attack means that even if a device had adequate defences against electronic attack when it was installed, the challenge may have changed to the extent that the operation of the device may be disrupted only a short time later. It should be noted that the nature of electronic attack can change very quickly, and that access to vulnerable networks has to be continuously managed. This may require a significant amount of resource.
Firewalls
Firewalls may be used in an effort to protect the devices on a communication network from disruption caused by external events, usually where there is a connection to a public network such as the internet.
Unfortunately a firewall has two requirements that potentially conflict with each other; that of speeding the transmission of legitimate communications traffic between the private and public network, and that of accurately identifying and preventing communications that may not be authorised, or which could result in damage to the private network, or devices connected to it.
The fast-changing nature of the threat posed by traffic on a public network means that firewalls have to be regularly monitored for potential breaches and upgraded to ensure protection is adequate. Some challenges may only become evident after they have caused damage to a system, and there is the potential for firewalls to prevent the transmission of legitimate information, possibly leading to a safety action.
NISCC (National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre) has produced a report that describes the challenges posed by communication systems on the control of industrial plant 9 .
The influence of data transmission media types
A number of data transmission media types are commonly used to transmit data. These include ordinary wires, special cabling, optical fibres, and wireless.
Wireless communications are potentially susceptible to outside influences that are not in control of the system designer such as interference from plant equipment, particular meteorological conditions, mobile telephones and other radio transmitters. Radio communications used for information technology networks may be insecure, allowing unauthorised access to safety-related communication systems.
For these reasons, radio transmissions should only be used for safety-related applications where the safety benefit to be gained is worth the potential for failed communications to disrupt safety systems, and where information cannot be gathered any other way.
Summary
The ease of use of digital communication systems has increased dramatically over the last few years, with 'plug and play' functionality allowing users to configure a wide variety of communication architectures quickly and easily. It is this ease of use that can lead users to believe that the system is more capable than it actually is, and that a working system will continue to work. Prices continue to fall and capability continues to rise, making the use of digital communication systems a very attractive option when considering the design of new plant or upgrades to older plant.
Users of digital communications in safety-related systems should be aware of the capabilities of these, and take action to ensure that risks are properly controlled. Challenges caused by the intermixing of safety and non safety-related systems, external influences, long term maintenance and operational requirements can all have significant effects on the level of safety actually achieved, and the resources that have to be deployed to maintain this level of safety.
Suggested key principles for the application of digital communication systems include: the aim of reducing the risk, so far as is reasonably practicable. 3. Only make connections between safety-related and non safetyrelated communication systems where detailed analysis shows there to be an overall reduction in risk, and where it can be shown that the risks can be maintained at an adequately low level despite the long term challenges posed by maintenance, modification, security, and human interaction. 4. Information used for safety-related purposes should have sufficient integrity for each safety function that uses that information. 5. Be aware that proven in use arguments for the adequacy of a communication system to carry safety-related information may not be appropriate where the intended usage differs in any way from a successful previous use. This may include the transmission of different data types, message lengths, communication channel loadings, environmental conditions, etc. Proven in use arguments need to be supported by sufficient data on usage conditions, failure rates, and evidence that robust data has been collected on failures. 6. Assess the potential for common cause failures to affect more than one part of the communication system at once, and take measures to ensure that the safety-related system is protected from this. 7. Where a safety function makes use of a communication system, there should be diagnostic capability of sufficient integrity to identify failures that may lead to a failure of that safety function to operate when it is needed. 8. Diagnostic checks of the correct functioning of any safety function that incorporates a communication system should be regular and thorough enough to ensure that risks are maintained at an adequately low level. Remote diagnosis should only be used when it is absolutely required.
9. Communication system devices should only be replaced by ones with identical software and hardware version numbers unless analysis has shown that a component of another type or version has the same capability as the component being replaced. Performance upgrades could reveal previously unanticipated failure modes that could adversely affect the ability of a safety-related system to respond to a demand. 10. Modifications to communication system components that contribute to safety should only be performed after an adequately thorough safety impact analysis that considers configuration settings, start-up, operational, fault, shutdown, testing, maintenance, and other appropriate modes. 11. Care should be taken to ensure that the communication system devices are adequately protected against the effects of inadvertent or malicious re-programming, including the effects of power outages and loss of memory.
